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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UT'AH 
PATRICIA M. BURNHAM, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BANKERS LIFE & CASUALTY 
COMP ANY, an Illinois corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
12261 
BRIEF O·F APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Mrs. Patricia M. Burnham seek-
ing recovery as beneficiary under a life insurance policy 
issued by defendant company to her husband, Dr. Preston 
Burnham, deceased. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The court below initially granted defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment, stating that the deceased 
had failed to disclose certain information on his reinstate-
ment application and that "this failure to disclose was 
a misrepresentation by omission and a fraud upon the 
insurer." Plaintiff appealed to this court and by unani-
1 
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mous opinion filed June 2, 1970, (R. 73-74) reported at 
470 P.2d 261 ( 1970) this court reversed the trial court 
holding that both the suicide clause and the contestability 
clause in the policy had, by their own terms, expired and 
there were no grounds upon which to predicate a revival 
of either. Defendant's petition for rehearing '\Vas denied 
by this court on July 16, 1970. (R. 72) Plaintiff after 
remand, (R. 78) moved for a summary judgment based 
upon the opinion of this court. (R. 79) The trial court 
denied plaintiff's motion. (R. 95) From this denial plain· 
tiff petitioned this court for an interlocutory appeal which 
petition was granted on December 21, 1970. (R. 106) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court and a 
remand with instructions to enter a summary judgment 
for plaintiff in accordance with plaintiff's motion in the 
lower court. (R. 79) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 1, 1962, defendant Bankers Life & Cas· 
ualty Company issued a life insurance policy to Dr. Pres· 
ton J. Burnham. The basic policy was a whole-life policy 
in the principal sum of $10,000. Attached to the policy 
for an additional premium was a rider providing a sup· 
plemental decreasing term benefit in the initial amount 
of $40,000 for a fifteen year term. (R. 3-6) The basic 
policy, along with the rider, continued in force until 
April 1, 1967, at which time the rider was deemed laps.ed 
for failure to pay premiums and the basic policy conttn· 
2 
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ued for a certain period, premium payments being made 
from the cash reserves. 
On June 28, 1967, Dr. Burnham made application 
for reinstatement of the policy and the rider. At that time 
Dr. Burnham completed an application for reinstatement 
(R. 26) wherein he answered certain questions concern-
ing the state of his health. 
On July 21, 1967, defendant accepted the premiums 
and reinstated the insurance policies. On February 20, 
1968, Dr. Burnham died of apparent suicide. On Janu-
ary 9, 1969, formal demand for payment was made upon 
the insurance company, and it refused to pay the amount 
due under the decreasing term rider. The whole life 
policy was paid and the premiums for the decreasing term 
rider were tendered back. Defendant refused to pay the 
amount claimed under the rider alleging fraud or mis-
representation in the reinstatement application: to-wit, 
failure to list Dr. Herbert B. Fowler as a "physician" con-
sulted by Dr. Burnham. 
Between February 13, 1963, and November 9, 1965, 
Dr. Burnham and his wife, the plaintiff, sought profes-
sional marriage counseling from Dr. Herbert B. Fowler, 
a doctor of psychiatry at the University Medical School. 
The deposition of Dr. Fowler indicates that he consulted 
Dr. and Mrs. Burnham on many occasions, but only in 
the capacity of a marriage counselor. He stated that he 
did not give any treatment to Dr. Burnham or consult 
with him at all except with respect to his marital diffi-
culties. There was no psychotherapy given and there was 
3 
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no medication administered. (Deposition of Dr. Fowler , 
pp. 18-19). Dr. Fowler stated that the counseling he gave 
could have as easily been given by someone who was 
not an M.D. (Deposition of Dr. Fowler, p. 35) and that 
I?r. Burnham came to him for counseling because, in Dr. 
Fowler's opinion, medical doctors with marital problems 
tend to seek out other medical doctors for advice. (Deposi-
tion of Dr. Fowler, p. 33). 
Dr. Fowler further stated that, although at times Dr. 
Burnham had expressed to him ideas such as that he 
wished he were dead, he (Dr. Fowler) did not consider 
these expressions serious; rather, he considered that they 
were quite normal for persons in the marital situation 
of Dr. Burnham. (Deposition of Dr. Fowler, pp. 24-27) 
Dr. Fowler stated that had he considered such expressions 
serious, he would have hospitalized Dr. Burnham. (De· 
position of Dr. Fowler, p. 26). Dr. Fowler never gave 
Dr. Burnham a physical examination or anything of that 
nature. (Deposition of Dr. Fowler, p. 17) 
Dr. Burnham although listing or physicians did not 
list Dr. Fowler as a "physician or practitioner" whom 
he had consulted on his application for reinstatement of 
the policy. Defendant moved for a summary judgment 
based upon that fact, and the trial court granted the mo· 
tion. This court reversed the trial court in Burnham v. 
Bankers Life, 470 P.2d 261 ( 1970). 
In its amended answer filed on July 31, 1969, (R. 
14-15) defendant admitted that the policy and rider were 
initially issued on January 1, 1962, that the policy lapsed 
4 
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on April 1, 1967, and was reinstated on July 21, 1967. 
Defendant further admitted that the insured, Preston J. 
Burnham, died in Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 25th day 
of February, 1968, and that at the time of death all prem-
iums accrued upon the policy were fully paid. 
The only defense alleged by defendant was the fol-
lowing: 
As a separate and affirmative defense, defendant 
alleges that the insurance policy described in 
plaintiff's complaint lapsed on April 1, 1967, ex-
cept for the provision providing for the payment 
of $10,000 and was reinstated on July 21, 1967, 
pursuant to an application from the deceased, Pres-
ton J. Burnham, in which it was agreed by and 
between the deceased and the defendant that the 
policy should be contestable on the account of 
fraud or misrepresentation in the material facts 
stated in said application within two years from 
the date of reinstatement of said policy. Defendant 
further alleges that at said time and place the 
deceased made a material misrepresentation of ma-
terial facts and that if said facts had been known 
to defendant at said time, said policy would not 
have been reinstated. (R. 15 ). (Emphasis added.) 
Based upon the opinion of this court (R. 73-74) re-
ported in 470 P.2d 261 (1970), plaintiff moved for a sum-
mary judgment on the ground that the opinion of this 
court disposed of every alleged defense of defendant. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The overriding issue on the appeal is whether the 
trial court should have granted plaintiff's motion for sum-
5 
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mary judgment based upon the previous opinion of th' 
• • lS 
court tn this case. Inherent in the resolution of this issue 
are the following questions: 
A. Whether, under the law as laid down by this 
court in this case, Burnham v. Bankers Life, 470 
P.2d 261 0970), the alleged defenses of de. 
fendant herein are foreclosed. 
B. Whether under the law as laid down by this i 
court in this case, Burnham v. Bankers Life, 470 
P.2d 261 0970), there remain any issues to be 
tried at the trial level. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS ALLEGED DEFENSES HA VE BEEN 
FORECLOSED BY THIS COURT IN ITS PRIOR 
OPINION, BURNHAM V. BANKERS LIFE, 470 P.2d 
261 (1970). 
The only defense to payment relied upon by defend· 
ant was its attempt to revive the contestability clause in 
the initial policy by means of a provision in the reinstate· 
ment application. (R. 15) A reading of this court's prior 
opinion in this case, Burnham v. Bankers Life, 470 P.2d 
261 (1970) clearly discloses the intent of this court to 
foreclose such a defense. 
After discussing the facts of the case this court, in 
its prior opinion, first stated that " ... although not dis· 
positive of the issues of this action ... a summary judg· 
6 
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ment was inappropriate because there were disputed is-
sues of material facts." Burnham, supra at 263. 
This court found that under the issues raised by the 
complaint and answer, those disputed material facts were: 
First, this court held with respect to misrepresentations 
in an application for an insurance policy that such mis-
representations in order to be relevant must "materially 
affect either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard as-
sumed by the insurer." The mere falsity of answers to 
questions propounded, this court reasoned, is insufficient 
if not knowingly made with an intent to deceive. Thus, 
even if defendant had been allowed to raise the issue 
of fraud, or misrepresentation, there was a question of 
intent which was a material issue of fact. Secondly, the 
court held that whether a misstatement in an application 
was material to the risk was a jury question dependent 
upon what a "reasonably careful and intelligent" insurer 
would have done had he known the allegedly misrepre-
sented facts. So again, even assuming the question of 
the materiality of a misrepresentation could be raised, 
there was a question of fact as to the materiality or im-
portance of the allegedly false information. Both issues 
of fact ref erred to by the court are issues raised by de-
fendant's alleged defense of fraud or misrepresentation 
of material facts in the reinstatement application and 
thus are now immaterial because defendant is precluded 
from raising that defense. 
Next, in its prior opinion this court discussed the 
questions of law raised by defendant's alleged defense. 
7 
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The provisions of the insurance contract relevant to a 
discussion of the law were found by this court to be: 
"Incontestability 
This policy shall be incontestable after it has 
been in force during the lifetime of the Insured 
for two years from its date of issue, except for 
nonpayment of premiums, * * * 
Suicide 
If within two years from the date of issue of 
this policy the Insured shall die by suicide, while 
sane or insane, the liability of the Company shall 
be limited to an amount equal to the premiums 
which have been paid for this policy. 
Reinstatement 
This policy may be reinstated (unless prev-
iously surrendered for its cash value) at any time 
within 5 years after default in premium payment, 
upon furnishing evidence of insurability satisfac-
tory to the Company, and the payment of all past 
due premiums with interest compounded at 5% 
per annum***" 
With respect to the foregoing provisions of the in· 
surance contract as affected by reinstatement this court, 
cited Gressler v. New York Life Insurance Company, 108 
Utah 173, 156 P.2d 212, modified on rehearing 108 Utah 
182, 163 P.2d 324 (1945) as sustaining the proposition 
that in Utah an application for reinstatement is 
neither an offer to enter into a new contract of 
insurance nor an offer to enter into a contract to 
reinstate the old policy; rather it is the first step 
taken to comply with the conditions of reinstate· 
ment. Burnham, supra at 264. 
8 
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Thus, this court held, the suicide clause by its own terms 
had expired, since time, in that case, was to be reckoned 
"from the date of issue of this policy" and not from the 
date of reinstatement. Burnham, supra at 264. 
With respect to the incontestability clause, this court 
held that since Utah is firmly committed to a doctrine 
"that a reinstated policy is a continuation of the original 
contract'' subsequent legislative enactments could not al-
ter the terms of the reinstatement clause and ingraft upon 
that clause terms not contained therein. Thus, the pro-
visions of Utah Code Annotated, §31-22-18(2) did not 
apply to this contract. 
Further, the court held that the attempt by the in-
surance company to insert a new contestability period 
into the policy by way of the reinstatement application 
was null and void. The court held that such language 
was in effect an attempt on the part of the insurer to 
make a contract of reinstatement. This court held that 
under Gressler reinstatement was not a contractual ar-
rangement but merely a step in compliance with the con-
dition specified in the original reinstatement clause of 
the contract. Burnham, supra at 265. 
This court then held that the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated, §31-22-18(1) did not start anew the 
contestability period upon reinstatement since the statute 
was enacted subsequent to the issuance of the original 
policy. Burnham, supra at 265. 
9 
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The court then summarized its holding m the foJ. 
lowing language: 
In the instant action, since the reinstatement was 
not, in contemplation of law, a new contract, but 
a continuation of the original policy, there is 00 
ground upon which to p1·edicate the revival of the 
contestability period after it has expired under the 
terms of the contract. Under the reinstatement 
clause the insurer was accorded the right to re. 
quire whatever evidence of insurability it deemed 
satisfactory and a fair opportunity to make a com-
plete investigation as to reinstatement. When the 
insurer finally determined that the conditions for 
reinstatement had been fulfilled, the original pol· 
icy was again in full force and effect as if there 
had been no prior lapse. Burnham, supra at 265. 
This court held that the suicide clause had expired, 
having commenced running on the date the policy was 
issued, and that the contestability clause had also expired, 
having commenced running on the issue date of the pol· 
icy and not having been recommenced upon reinstate· 
ment. Thus, the only issues conceivably raised by the 
pleadings on file in this case, whether there was material 
fraud in the reinstatement application, were disposed of 
by this court in its prior opinion with the holding that 
such issues were barred by the terms of the original policy. 
B;:ised upon these facts and this law, plaintiff moved 
for a summary judgment in the court below and her mo· 
tion was denied. This court should reverse the trial court, 
remand the case and order summary judgment to be en· 
tered for plaintiff in accordance with her motion (R. 79). 
10 
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POINT II 
THERE ARE NO TRIABLE ISSUES REMAINING 
IN THIS CASE AND NOTHING BUT DELAY AND 
CONTINUED HARASSMENT OF PLAINTIFF CAN 
BE ACCOMPLISHED BY REMANDING THIS CASE 
FOR TRIAL. 
Based upon the opinion of this court in Burnham, 
supra, there are no triable issues in the case. Defendant 
admitted issuing the policy, and reinstating the same. 
The amounts due under the policy rider are easily cal-
culable from the policy and the amounts claimed by plain-
tiff in her motion (R. 79) were not objected to by de-
fendant. Thus, since defendant cannot argue that there 
was material fraud in the reinstatement, defendant can 
do nothing but pay on the policy. This court in its prior 
opinion ordered that the case be remanded to the trial 
court "for the disposition in accordance with this opin-
ion." That opinion required in effect a striking of all 
of defendant's defenses and upon motion of plaintiff for 
a summary judgment or a judgment on the pleadings, 
such a judgment should have been granted. This court 
should reverse the trial court and order summary judg-
ment entered for plaintiff, as prayed in her motion (R. 79) 
together with costs of the action. 
11 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the prior opinion of this court in Burn. 
ham v. Bankers Life, 470 P. 2d 261 (1970), there are no 
triable issues left in the case and defendant has been pre-
cluded by law from asserting its alleged defenses. There-
fore, this court should reverse the trial court's refusal to 
grant summary judgment for plaintiff and order the case 
remanded and summary judgment entered in favor of 
plaintiff as prayed by her motion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE & 
MANGUM 
Robert M. Yeates 
Denis R. Morrill 
12 
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